brock911fandomcom-20200216-history
Q1 2001
''This is a new article. As such is has been set to unassessed. Category:Content General Early 2001: Bin Laden Warns of Massive Attack on US in Training Camp Speech During a post-9/11 trial in Germany, Shadi Abdellah, a militant who briefly served as one of bin Laden’s bodyguards, will claim that in early 2001, “Bin Laden spoke in a speech of an attack against the United States and said there would be thousands of dead.… When there was an attack, we weren’t told. They just said to us, ‘pray for your brothers.’” Abdellah spent time at al-Qaeda training camps from early 2000 until May 2001, so presumably this speech was in May or before. Abdellah will be captured in Germany in 2002 for a role in helping to plot attacks against Jewish targets there (see April 2002). 11/28/2002; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 11/2/2004 Bin Laden will make other similar public comments hinting at a massive attack against the US later in the summer of 2001 (see Summer 2001). While it is unknown if US intelligence is aware of such speeches before 9/11, by July 2001 the CIA will report that a source in Afghanistan has said, “Everyone is talking about an impending attack” (see July 2001). Entity Tags: Osama bin Laden, Shadi Abdellah Category Tags: Warning Signs Early 2001: FBI Slow to React to French Report on Bin Laden’s Finances French experts give an in-depth report on bin Laden’s financial network to a senior FBI official, according to a source close to French intelligence. A month later, the FBI official admits to his French colleagues that the document still hasn’t been translated into English. ANGELES TIMES, 10/14/2001 It is not known what the FBI does with the report after that, if anything. Early 2001: CIA Asset Tests Al-Qaeda Training Camp for Chemical Weapons As part of a new US intelligence effort to prevent al-Qaeda getting weapons of mass destruction, “a third-country national working for the CIA” goes into an al-Qaeda training camp in Afghanistan where chemical weapons are possibly being made. The agent takes soil samples, but later analysis does not show any dangerous chemicals. According to counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke, the “CIA took pride in the risks the third-country national had run in going to the camp.” 2004, PP. 178-179 Early 2001: Top Military Leaders Attend Briefings on Able Danger In January, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Henry Shelton is given a three hour briefing on Able Danger. Shelton supported the formation of Able Danger back in 1999 (see Fall 1999). The content of the briefing has never been reported. Then in March, during a briefing on another classified program called Door Hop Galley, Able Danger is again brought up. This briefing, given by Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer, is attended by Vice Adm. Thomas Wilson, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency; Richard Schiefren, an attorney at DOD; and Stephen Cambone, Special Assistant to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense. SECURITY NEWS, 9/2005; OFFICE OF CONGRESSMAN CURT WELDON, 9/17/2005 SOURCES: CURT WELDON In mid-September 2005, Weldon will say, “I knew that the Clinton administration clearly knew about this. Now I know of at least two briefings in the Bush administration.” He calls these two briefings “very troubling.” He wants to know what became of the information presented in these briefings, suggesting it shouldn’t have been destroyed as part of the other Able Danger data purges. COUNTY DAILY TIMES, 9/16/2005; OFFICE OF CONGRESSMAN CURT WELDON, 9/17/2005 Early 2001: Bush Staffers Less Concerned with Terrorism Donald Kerrick. White House Clinton and Bush staff overlap for several months while new Bush appointees are appointed and confirmed. Clinton holdovers seem more concerned about al-Qaeda than the new Bush staffers. For instance, according to a colleague, Sandy Berger, Clinton’s National Security Adviser, had become “totally preoccupied” with fears of a domestic terror attack. 5/27/2002 Brian Sheridan, Clinton’s outgoing Deputy Defense Secretary for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, is astonished when his offers during the transition to bring the new military leadership up to speed on terrorism are brushed aside. “I offered to brief anyone, any time on any topic. Never took it up.” ANGELES TIMES, 3/30/2004 Army Lieutenant General Donald Kerrick, Deputy National Security Adviser and manager of Clinton’s NSC (National Security Council) staff, still remains at the NSC nearly four months after Bush takes office. He later notes that while Clinton’s advisers met “nearly weekly” on terrorism by the end of his term, he does not detect the same kind of focus with the new Bush advisers: “That’s not being derogatory. It’s just a fact. I didn’t detect any activity but what holdover Richard Clarke and the CSG Security Group were doing.” POST, 1/20/2002 Kerrick submits a memo to the new people at the NSC, warning, “We are going to be struck again.” He says, “They never responded. It was not high on their priority list. I was never invited to one meeting. They never asked me to do anything. They were not focusing. They didn’t see terrorism as the big megaissue that the Clinton administration saw it as.” Kerrick adds, “They were gambling nothing would happen.” ANGELES TIMES, 3/30/2004 Bush’s first Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman, Henry Shelton, later says terrorism was relegated “to the back burner” until 9/11. POST, 10/2/2002 Entity Tags: Hugh Shelton, National Security Council, Al-Qaeda, Bush administration, Clinton administration, Donald Kerrick, Brian Sheridan, Counterterrorism and Security Group, Sandy Berger Category Tags: Counterterrorism Policy/Politics Early 2001: Taliban Disinformation Project Is Cancelled The heads of the US military, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have become frustrated by the lack of CIA disinformation operations to create dissent among the Taliban, and at the very end of the Clinton administration, they begin to develop a Taliban disinformation project of their own, which is to go into effect in 2001. When they are briefed, the Defense Department’s new leaders kill the project. According to Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Henry Shelton, “Secretary Rumsfeld and Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz were against the Joint Staff having the lead on this.” They consider this a distraction from their core military missions. As far as Rumsfeld is concerned, “This terrorism thing was out there, but it didn’t happen today, so maybe it belongs lower on the list… so it gets defused over a long period of time.” ANGELES TIMES, 3/30/2004 Entity Tags: Taliban, Paul Wolfowitz, Donald Rumsfeld, US Department of Defense, Hugh Shelton, Central Intelligence Agency, Clinton administration Category Tags: Counterterrorism Action Before 9/11 Early 2001-September 11, 2001: Bush Administration Loses Interest in Apprehending Taliban-Linked Arms Dealer Victor Bout Lee Wolosky. Center for American Progress By the end of the Clinton administration, an effort by some US officials to arrest international arms dealer Victor Bout is gathering steam (see Early Spring 1999-2000). National Security Council (NSC) adviser Lee Wolosky has been gathering evidence of Bout’s airplanes being used to smuggle weapons and possibly drugs for the Taliban. Shortly after the Bush administration takes office, counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke, Wolosky, and other NSC deputies hold a briefing about Bout’s activities for Condoleezza Rice, the new national security adviser. Rice appears interested, and authorizes the NSC team to continue to pursue an attempt to get an arrest warrant for Bout strong enough to secure a conviction. AND BRAUN, 2007, PP. 186-187 However, Rice focuses on diplomatic solutions and does not allow any actual covert action against Bout. The FBI also does not have an open investigation into Bout and does not appear particularly interested in him. “Look but don’t touch,” is how one White House official will later describe Rice’s approach. YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, 8/17/2003; FARAH AND BRAUN, 2007, PP. 193 In late spring 2001, Wolosky briefs Deputy National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley about Bout and global organized crime. He receives a go-ahead to present a full briefing to President Bush on the topic, but no specific date is set. Wolosky is still trying to arrange a date when the 9/11 attacks occur. The Bush administration’s interest in Bout was already fading before 9/11, and after 9/11 the remaining interest in him is lost, despite Bout’s ties to the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Wolosky soon quits. “We knew we were being phased out,” he will later say. AND BRAUN, 2007, PP. 193-194 Bout moves to Russia not long after 9/11, but Rice decides that Russia should not be pressured about arms trafficking in general and Bout in particular. One source who talks to Rice claims that she reasons the US has “bigger fish to fry.” YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, 8/17/2003 Entity Tags: Victor Bout, George W. Bush, Stephen J. Hadley, Condoleezza Rice, Lee Wolosky, Richard A. Clarke, National Security Council, Bush administration Category Tags: Counterterrorism Policy/Politics, Victor Bout January 2001-Summer 2001: Hijackers Live in Toronto Apartment Building with Al-Marabh Ahmed Shehab. Ahmedshehab.com The landlord and at least twelve tenants of a Toronto high rise building see Marwan Alshehhi living there in the spring of 2001. Other witnesses recall seeing Alshehhi and/or Mohamed Atta in or near the building. Nabil al-Marabh is sporadically staying in the same building in an apartment unit owned by his uncle, Ahmed Shehab, a prominent local imam. None of the witnesses appear to have sighted any of the other hijackers. Alshehhi and Atta are also seen by eyewitnesses around this time at a Toronto photocopy shop owned by Shehab, and there are even some who see Atta occasionally working there (see January 2001-Summer 2001). SUN, 9/28/2001; TORONTO SUN, 9/28/2001; ABC NEWS 7 (CHICAGO), 1/31/2002 The apartment where al-Marabh stayed will not be raided by police until about two weeks after 9/11, and one week after reports of al-Marabh’s connections to the hijackers has been in the newspapers. The Toronto Sun will report, “Many building residents questioned why police waited so long to raid the apartment after al-Marabh was arrested. Several tenants alleged they had seen a man late at night during the past week, taking away boxes from the apartment.” SUN, 9/28/2001 Al-Marabh also shares a Toronto apartment with Hassan Almrei, a Syrian who the Canadian authorities are already suspecting for possible militant ties (see September 13, 2000 and After). One article says that are roommates in 2001, and it would likely mean early 2001 since al-Marabh leaves Toronto during the summer. Canadian authorities will later arrest Almrei and discover that he has extensive connections with al-Qaeda (see October 19, 2001). NEWS 7 (CHICAGO), 1/31/2002 Some of the 9/11 hijackers may have been in Toronto as late as the end of August 2001. A motel manager in Hollywood, Florida, will later say that Mohamed Atta and Ziad Jarrah stay at his motel on August 30, 2001. He will say they gave a non-existent Toronto address and drove a car with Ontario, Canada, license plates. They claimed to be computer engineers from Iran, and said they had just come down from Canada to find jobs. POST, 10/4/2001; TORONTO SUN, 10/5/2001 Entity Tags: Mohamed Atta, Marwan Alshehhi, Ahmed Shehab, Hassan Almrei, Nabil al-Marabh Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Marwan Alshehhi, Mohamed Atta, Nabil Al-Marabh January 2001-Summer 2001: Hijackers Witnessed Preparing False IDs in Toronto Photocopy Shop with Al-Marabh The Toronto photocopy shop owned by Nabil al-Marabh’s uncle. CTV Many eyewitnesses see Marwan Alshehhi and Mohamed Atta at a Toronto photocopy shop owned by Nabil al-Marabh’s uncle Ahmed Shehab, a prominent local imam. Some of the dozens of eyewitness accounts say Atta sporadically works in the shop. There is a large picture of bin Laden hanging in the store. Alshehhi and Atta are also seen by other eyewitnesses in a Toronto apartment building during this same time period (see January 2001-Summer 2001). SUN, 10/21/2001 In a series of raids after 9/11, many partially completed fake IDs will be found in the store and at al-Marabh’s apartment. A stack of tightly-controlled immigration forms enabling one to immigrate to Canada will also be found. SUN, 9/28/2001; TORONTO SUN, 10/5/2001; TORONTO SUN, 10/16/2001 According to the Toronto Sun, “Forensic officers said there are similarities in the paper stock, laminates, and ink seized from the downtown store and that which was used in identification left behind by the hijackers.” SUN, 10/16/2001 January-September 10, 2001: Bush Administration Slow to Develop New Policy Regarding Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Al-Qaeda After the Bush administration takes office in January 2001, it is slow to develop new approaches to Pakistan and Afghanistan. National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice orders a new policy review for al-Qaeda, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, but sets no deadline for it to be completed. State Department officials will later say that Secretary of State Colin Powell shows little interest in the policy review. It takes four months for the Bush administration to even nominate a new assistant secretary of state for South Asian affairs. President Bush and Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf exchange formal letters with each other shortly after Bush takes office, but the letters have little impact. In January, US ambassador to Pakistan William Milam prepares two cables to brief the new Bush administration about Pakistan, the Taliban, and al-Qaeda. There is no response from Washington and no request for further information, even though Milam is the point person for meetings with the Taliban. The US embassy is not consulted at all about the new policy review, indicating just how low a priority the review is. A senior US diplomat will later say: “Al-Qaeda was not on the radar screen in Washington. Nobody thought there was any urgency to the policy review. Papers were circulated, dates were made to meet, and were broken—it was the usual bureaucratic approach.” The first significant meeting related to the review takes place in April, but little is accomplished (see April 30, 2001). The first cabinet-level meeting relating to the policy review takes place on September 4, just one week before the 9/11 attacks. US policy towards Pakistan is discussed, but no firm decisions are reached (see September 4, 2001). After 9/11, Rice will say: “America’s al-Qaeda policy wasn’t working because our Afghanistan policy wasn’t working. And our Afghanistan policy wasn’t working because our Pakistan policy wasn’t working. We recognized that America’s counterterrorism policy had to be connected to our regional strategies and our overall foreign policy.… Al-Qaeda was both a client of and patron to the Taliban, which in turn was supported by Pakistan. Those relationships provided al-Qaeda with a powerful umbrella of protection, and we had to sever that.” 2008, PP. 56-60 Jan Feb 2001 General Spring 2001: US Customs Investigate Three Hijackers Before 9/11 Satam Al Suqami. FBI In the wake of the foiled al-Qaeda plot to blow up hotels in Jordan during the millennium celebrations, Jordan gives tips to the US that launch a Customs investigation into one of the plotters, Raed Hijazi, and his US connections. “Customs agents for months traced money flowing from several Boston banks to banks overseas, where officials believe the funds were intended for bin Laden’s network.” In September and October 2000, Jordanian officials gave US investigators evidence of financial transactions connecting Raed Hijazi, Nabil al-Marabh, and future 9/11 hijacker Hamza Alghamdi (see September 2000; October 2000). By spring 2001, Custom agents further connect al-Marabh and Hijazi to financial deals with future 9/11 hijackers Ahmed Alghamdi and Satam Al Suqami. The Washington Post will later note, “These various connections not only suggest that investigators are probing ties between bin Laden and the hijackers, but also that federal authorities knew about some of those associations long before the bombings.” POST, 9/21/2001 It appears that the money flowed from al-Marabh to Alghamdi and Al Suqami. NEWS SERVICE, 10/16/2001; ABC NEWS 7 (CHICAGO), 1/31/2002 While accounts of these connections to Alghamdi and Al Suqami will be widely reported in the media in the months after 9/11, a Customs Service spokesman will say he can neither confirm nor deny the existence of the inquiry. YORK TIMES, 9/18/2001 It appears that the two hijackers are not put on any kind of watch list and are not stopped when they arrive in the US on April 23, 2001, and May 2, 2001, respectively (see April 23-June 29, 2001). British newspapers will note that Alghamdi was one of several hijackers who should have been “instantly ‘red-flagged’ by British intelligence” but in fact is not when he passes through Britain sometime in early 2001 (see January-June 2001). The 9/11 Commission Final Report will fail to mention the Customs investigation and will give no hint that these hijackers’ names were known in the US before 9/11. Entity Tags: Satam Al Suqami, Raed Hijazi, 9/11 Commission, Nabil al-Marabh, US Customs Service, Jordan, Ahmed Alghamdi Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Key Hijacker Events, Key Warnings, Warning Signs, Millennium Bomb Plots, Other 9/11 Hijackers, Nabil Al-Marabh Spring 2001: CIA Official’s Suggestion to ‘Rain Hell’ on Taliban Is Not Well Received by Other US Ofificals John McLaughlin. CIA According to a later account by CIA Director George Tenet, Deputy CIA Director John McLaughlin expresses frustration at the lack of action about bin Laden during a meeting of deputy cabinet officials. McLaughlin reportedly says, “I think we should deliver an ultimatum to the Taliban. They either hand bin Laden over or we rain hell on them.” According to Tenet, “An odd silence followed. No one seemed to like the idea. Richard Armitage, the deputy secretary of state, called John after the meeting and offered a friendly word of advice: ‘You are going to get your suspenders snapped if you keep making policy recommendations. That is not your role.’” 2007, PP. 145 Entity Tags: John E. McLaughlin, George J. Tenet, Richard Armitage Category Tags: Hunt for Bin Laden Spring 2001: CIA Director Tenet Warns Congress an Attempted Terrorist Attack against US Interests Is Likely within a Year CIA Director George Tenet testifies before Congress, saying, “I consider it likely that over the next year or so there will be an attempted terrorist attack against US interests.” He also says, “We will generally not have specific time and place warning of terrorist attacks.” 2007, PP. 145 Apparently this is in private Congressional session because a search of the Lexis Nexus article database turns up no media mentions of these quotes until they are mentioned in Tenet’s 2007 book. Entity Tags: George J. Tenet, US Congress Category Tags: Warning Signs Spring 2001: Attorney General Ashcroft Doesn’t Want FBI Director to Talk About Terrorism Attorney General John Ashcroft. US Department of Justice Attorney General John Ashcroft talks with FBI Director Louis Freeh before an annual meeting of special agents. Ashcroft lays out his priorities, which according to one participant is “basically violent crime and drugs.” Freeh bluntly replies that those are not his priorities and he talks about counterterrorism. “Ashcroft does not want to hear about it,” says one witness. 5/27/2002 Entity Tags: Louis J. Freeh, John Ashcroft Category Tags: Counterterrorism Policy/Politics Spring 2001: Arab Man in Texas Offered Money to Take Flying Lessons; Later Claims to Recognize 9/11 Hijacker According to his later testimony, Mustafa Abu Jdai, a 28-year-old Jordanian of Palestinian descent living in Tyler, Texas, answers a job offer posted in a Dallas mosque. He then meets with three Arabic-speaking men who offer to pay him to take flying lessons in Texas, Florida, or Oklahoma. He declines the offer. On September 13, 2001, two days after the 9/11 attacks, Jdai will call the FBI to relate his story. From FBI pictures, he recognizes hijacker Marwan Alshehhi. However, the FBI takes him into custody for overstaying his visa. The FBI says he invented his story and failed a polygraph. Although he is married to an American woman, he will be detained for several months and deported. 10/28/2001; WASHINGTON POST, 11/4/2001; WATCH, 8/2002, PP. 16 Entity Tags: Marwan Alshehhi, Mustafa Abu Jdai, Federal Bureau of Investigation Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Marwan Alshehhi (Spring 2001): Hijacker Jarrah Allegedly Obtains Commercial Pilot’s License Ziad Jarrah standing next to a Cessna in Florida. National Geographic Ziad Jarrah is said to obtain a commercial pilot’s license around this time by flight school owner Arne Kruithof, although neither the FBI nor any other official body will confirm this. Jarrah obtained a private pilot’s license from Florida Flight Training Center (FFTC) (see (June 28-December 2000)) in 2000 and then spent a few hours on Boeing simulators later in 2000 (see December 15, 2000-January 8, 2001). FFTC owner Kruithof will later say that he was told Jarrah obtained a commercial license: “He was supposed to come back and finish his commercial pilot license, but he did not. Later, I found out that he did it somewhere else.” However, there is no mention of where he may have obtained such additional training. AND FIELDING, 2003, PP. 133 Entity Tags: Ziad Jarrah, Arne Kruithof Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Ziad Jarrah, Alleged Hijackers' Flight Training Spring-Summer 2001: Hijackers Allegedly Receive Extra Training on Large Aircraft According to an associate of the 9/11 hijackers, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, and flight school owner Rudi Dekkers, the hijackers have more training on large jets than the FBI will disclose. The FBI will say that the four hijacker pilots never fly real large jets before 9/11 and have a total of approximately 17 sessions on large aircraft simulators, mostly on older models: Both Mohamed Atta and Marwan Alshehhi each take two sessions lasting 90 minutes on a Boeing 727 simulator and one session on a simulator for a Boeing 767, the type of aircraft they fly on 9/11 (see December 29-31, 2000); Ziad Jarrah, who flies a Boeing 757 on 9/11, has five sessions on 727s and 737s (see December 15, 2000-January 8, 2001); Hani Hanjour, who flies a Boeing 757 on 9/11, practices for a total of 21 hours on a Boeing 737-200 simulator (see February 8-March 12, 2001). When he learns what the FBI believes is the extent of the hijackers’ training, bin al-Shibh will complain in a fax sent to a reporter after 9/11: “How do aviation experts evaluate the skill with which the aircraft were flown, especially the Pentagon attack—accurate and professional as it was? Is it credible that the executers had never before flown a Boeing? Is it credible they only had some lessons on small twin-engine aircrafts and some lessons on simulators?” Referring to the period in early 2001 after the pilots spend a few hours practicing on simulators, bin al-Shibh will say, “What they needed was more flying hours, more training on simulators of large commercial planes such as Boeing 747s and Boeing 767s, as well as studying security precautions in all airports.” However, apparently bin al-Shibh does not mention exactly when or where such additional training took place, if in fact it did. AND FIELDING, 2003, PP. 24-6, 38, 134 Interviewed two days after 9/11, Dekkers, at whose flight school Mohamed Atta and Marwan Alshehhi initially trained (see July 6-December 19, 2000), will comment, “After the training they had here they went to another flight school in Pompano Beach and they had jet training there, simulator or big planes, but there is where they conducted the training to do what they had to do.” Dekkers will say that he has heard this “from several directions.” However, the Pompano Beach school is not named. 9/13/2001 Entity Tags: Rudi Dekkers, Marwan Alshehhi, Ziad Jarrah, Hani Hanjour, Mohamed Atta, Ramzi bin al-Shibh Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Marwan Alshehhi, Mohamed Atta, Hani Hanjour, Ziad Jarrah, Alleged Hijackers' Flight Training Spring-Summer 2001: Bin Laden Tells Mother He Cannot Call Her Again Due to Upcoming ‘Great Events’ Der Spiegel will later report that in a “very brief conversation Osama tells his mother that he will not be able to call again for a long time, a remark that seems cryptic to the agents listening in at the time, especially when Osama adds that ‘great events are about to take place.’” The NSA had been tracking Osama bin Laden’s satellite phone number since 1996, and also tracking the number of his mother, Hamida al-Attas, living in Saudi Arabia, on the off chance he would call her and tell her something important. Bin Laden apparently had called her more than anyone else, but this is his last call to her. Around this time, President Bush is so convinced that the best way to catch bin Laden is through his mother that he is reputed to tell the Emir of Qatar, “We know that he’ll call his mother one day - and then we’ll get him.” Hamida has remained loyal to her son in the wake of 9/11, saying in 2003, “I disapprove of the ambitions the press ascribe to him, but I am satisfied with Osama, and I pray to God that He will guide him along the right path.” 3/12/2002; DER SPIEGEL (HAMBURG), 6/6/2005 Note that this warning is similar to, but apparently different from, another warning phone call bin Laden makes in early September 2001. That call is to Al-Khalifa bin Laden, his stepmother and not his mother, who lives in Syria and not Saudi Arabia (see September 9, 2001). Entity Tags: National Security Agency, George W. Bush, Hamida al-Attas, Osama bin Laden Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Warning Signs, Saudi Arabia, Bin Laden Family, Remote Surveillance, Key Warnings March March 2001: Bin Laden Targets Passenger Planes at Chicago Airport 9/11 Commissioner Bob Kerrey will mention in a public hearing, “In March 2001, another CSG Security Group item on the agenda mentions the possibility of alleged bin Laden interests in ‘targeting US passenger planes at the Chicago airport,’ end of quote.” COMMISSION, 3/24/2004 No newspaper has ever mentioned this warning, which presumably remained classified aside from this one accidental mention by Kerrey. Entity Tags: Bob Kerrey, Osama bin Laden Category Tags: Warning Signs March 2001: Senior Military Officials Informed of Able Danger Program During a briefing on another classified program called Dorkawk Galley, Able Danger is again brought up. This briefing, given by Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer, is attended by Vice Adm. Thomas Wilson, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency; Richard Schiffrin, an attorney at DOD; and Stephen Cambone, Special Assistant to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense. SECURITY NEWS, 9/2005; OFFICE OF CONGRESSMAN CURT WELDON, 9/17/2005 SOURCES: CURT WELDON In mid-September 2005, Weldon will say, “I knew that the Clinton administration clearly knew about this.” Referring to this meeting and another meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff (see Early 2001), he will add, “Now I know of at least two briefings in the Bush administration.” He calls these two briefings “very troubling.” He wants to know what became of the information presented in these briefings, suggesting it shouldn’t have been destroyed as part of the other Able Danger data purges. COUNTY DAILY TIMES, 9/16/2005; OFFICE OF CONGRESSMAN CURT WELDON, 9/17/2005 Entity Tags: Stephen A. Cambone, Thomas Wilson, Richard Schiefren, Clinton administration, Able Danger, Anthony Shaffer, Bush administration, Henry Hugh Shelton Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Able Danger March 2001: Italians Advise US about Al-Qaeda Wiretaps The Italian government gives the US information about possible attacks based on apartment wiretaps in the Italian city of Milan. NEWS, 5/17/2002 Presumably, the information includes a discussion between two al-Qaeda agents talking about a “very, very secret” plan to forge documents “for the brothers who are going to the United States” (see January 24, 2001). The warning may also mention a wiretap the previous August involving one of the same people, who discussed a massive strike against the enemies of Islam involving aircraft (see August 12, 2000) and another of his monitored conversations in which he discusses travel by al-Qaeda operatives to the US (see February 2001). Entity Tags: Al-Qaeda Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Warning Signs, Foreign Intelligence Warnings, Al-Qaeda in Italy, Remote Surveillance March 2001: Al-Qaeda to Attack Inside the US in April An intelligence source claims that a group of al-Qaeda operatives is planning to conduct an unspecified attack inside the US in April. One of the operatives allegedly resides in the US. There are also reports of planned attacks in California and New York State for the same month, though whether this is reference to the same plot is unclear. CONGRESS, 7/24/2003 Entity Tags: Al-Qaeda Category Tags: Warning Signs March 2001: Cheney’s Energy Task Force Eyes Iraq’s Oil Reserves Cheney’s Energy Task Force authors a variety of documents relating to the oil industries of Iraq, United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia. WATCH, 7/17/2003; CBS NEWS, 1/10/2004; NEW YORK TIMES, 1/12/2004 Foreign Suitors for Iraqi Oilfield contracts - This document, dated March 5, 2001, includes a table listing 30 countries which have interests in Iraq’s oil industry. The document also includes the names of companies that have interests, the oil fields with which those interests are associated, as well as the statuses of those interests. PRESIDENT, 2001 ; VICE PRESIDENT, 2001 Map of Iraq's oil fields - The map includes markings for “supergiant” oil fields of 5 billion barrels or more, other oilfields, fields “earmarked for production sharing,” oil pipelines, operational refineries, and tanker terminals. PRESIDENT, 2001 Other documents - Other documents include oil field maps and project tables for both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates PRESIDENT, 2001; VICE PRESIDENT, 2001; VICE PRESIDENT, 2001; VICE PRESIDENT, 2001 Entity Tags: Richard (“Dick”) Cheney Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion Category Tags: Alleged Iraq-Al-Qaeda Links March 2001: Regional Expert Sees Continuing Close Ties Between the CIA and ISI Selig Harrison. Publicity photo Selig Harrison, a long-time regional expert working at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars, says, “the CIA still has close links with the ISI.” Harrison is said to have “extensive contact with the CIA and political leaders in South Asia.” He also claims that the US worked with Pakistan to create the Taliban. OF INDIA, 3/7/2001 Similarly, in 2000, Ahmed Rashid, longtime regional correspondent for the Financial Times and the Daily Telegraph, called the US “Pakistan’s closest ally, with deep links to Pakistan’s military and the ISI.” Rashid agrees with Harrison that the US had a role in the creation of the Taliban. FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY, 9/13/2001 Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Taliban, Pakistan Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, Selig Harrison Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI March 2001: Some 9/11 Hijackers Record Videos in Afghanistan Pledging Martyrdom Stills from martyr videos recorded in March 2001. From top to bottom: Ahmed Alhaznawi, Abdulaziz Alomari, Saeed Alghamdi, Wail Alshehri, and Hamza Alghamdi. The backgrounds were digitally inserted later. Al-Jazeera Supposedly, all 13 of the “muscle” hijackers record a farewell video before leaving training in Kandahar, Afghanistan, around this time. NEWS, 10/9/2002 Several will be released after 9/11. A video of Ahmed Alhaznawi will be shown by the Al Jazeera television network in April 2002. In it, he pledges to give his life to “martyrdom” and swears to send a “bloodied message” to Americans by attacking them in their “heartland.” 4/16/2002 In September 2002, Al Jazeera will show a similar farewell video of Abdulaziz Alomari made around the same time. PRESS, 9/9/2002 Alomari states, “I am writing this with my full conscience and I am writing this in expectation of the end, which is near… God praise everybody who trained and helped me, namely the leader Sheik Osama bin Laden.” POST, 9/11/2002 Saeed Alghamdi’s video will be released in September 2003, and Wail Alshehri and Hamza Alghamdi’s videos will be released in September 2006 (see September 7, 2006). PRESS, 9/7/2006 Entity Tags: Satam Al Suqami, Osama bin Laden, Salem Alhazmi, Waleed M. Alshehri, Mohand Alshehri, Wail Alshehri, Majed Moqed, Saeed Alghamdi, Fayez Ahmed Banihammad, Ahmed Alghamdi, Abdulaziz Alomari, Ahmed Alhaznawi, Ahmed Alnami, Hamza Alghamdi Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Other 9/11 Hijackers, Alleged Al-Qaeda Media Statements Between March 2001 and May 2001: Richard Clarke: Bush Officials Discuss Creating Casus Belli for War with Iraq Counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke later says that sometime between March and May, Bush administration officials discussed creating a casus belli for war with Iraq. In a 2007 interview with radio show host Jon Elliot, Clarke says: “Prior to 9/11 a number of people in the White House were saying to me you know this—this administration, particularly Cheney, but also Bush and people like Wolfowitz in the Pentagon, are really intent on going to war with Iraq. And this was the whispered conversations in the National Security Council staff.… Early, early on in the administration people I knew and trusted in the administration were saying to me, ‘You know. They’re really going to do it. They are going to go to war with Iraq.’ And I was flabbergasted. Why would you want to do that of all the things in the world that one could choose to do?… And how are we going to do it? How are we going to cause that provocation? And there was some discussion of ‘Well maybe we’ll keep flying aircraft over Iraq and maybe one day one of them will be shot down.’… And some of the talk I was hearing—in the March, April, May timeframe—‘Maybe we’ll do something that is so provocative and do it in such a way that our aircraft will be shot down.’ And then we’ll have an excuse to go to war with Iraq.” ELLIOT SHOW, 1/11/2007 SOURCES: RICHARD A. CLARKE Entity Tags: Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, George W. Bush, Richard A. Clarke Timeline Tags: Alleged Use of False Flag Attacks, Events Leading to Iraq Invasion Category Tags: Alleged Iraq-Al-Qaeda Links March 2001: Justice Department Investigation Finds FISA Applications Are Misleading Royce Lamberth’s letter to John Ashcroft, obtained by the 9/11 Timeline by Freedom of Information Act request. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court The Justice Department’s Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR) discovers that an application for a warrant under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) is misleading. The application is for surveillance of the Palestinian militant group Hamas and the supporting affidavit was signed by FBI agent Michael Resnick. The Justice Department’s Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) is already investigating dozens of similar errors in FISA warrants for surveillance of al-Qaeda targets in the US (see Summer 2000-September 11, 2001). The application is misleading because its does not accurately describe the “wall” procedures being followed by several FBI field offices. Wall procedures regulate the passage of information from FBI intelligence agents to FBI criminal agents and local US attorneys’ offices. The misleading description is also found in another 14 warrant applications for surveillance of Hamas. The impact of the misleading statements in the Hamas investigations has not been disclosed, but in the al-Qaeda cases the wall was breached because criminal agents had unrestricted access to intelligence information (see Summer-October 2000). Royce Lamberth, Presiding Judge on the FISA Court, writes to Attorney General John Ashcroft saying it will no longer accept any applications where the supporting affidavit is signed by Resnick and asking for an immediate inquiry. INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT, 3/9/2001 ; NEW YORK TIMES, 9/19/2001; NEW YORK TIMES, 5/27/2002; WASHINGTON POST, 8/23/2002; ARAB NEWS, 3/3/2004; US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 11/2004, PP. 39 The Justice Department’s investigation into the misleading applications finds that “none of them… were the result of professional misconduct or poor judgement,” but that “a majority of the errors were the result of systemic flaws.” DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 11/2004, PP. 40 Following the discovery of the errors in the FISA applications, surveillance of al-Qaeda and Hamas targets in the US is curtailed (see April 2001). Resnick remains with the bureau and will become head of the Joint Terrorism Task Force in North Carolina and then chief of the Terrorist Identities Group at the FBI’s National Counter Terrorism Center. CONGRESS, 3/30/2006; WCNC, 6/20/2006 Entity Tags: John Ashcroft, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, Michael Resnick, Catcher’s Mitt, Royce Lamberth, Federal Bureau of Investigation Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Counterterrorism Policy/Politics, Remote Surveillance March 2001: Former Air Traffic Controler Offered Position of National Operations Manager; Only Begins Job on September 11 Ben Sliney, a former air traffic controller and FAA manager who has been working as a lawyer in the private sector for many years, is offered the position of national operations manager at the FAA’s Command Center in Herndon, Virginia. The offer is made by Jack Kies, the FAA’s manager of tactical operations. Sliney agrees to return to the FAA but asks to work first as a traffic management specialist at the Command Center, to learn the learn the operational details of the center from the ground up. After six months, Kies will again approach Sliney and offer him the job of national operations manager, and Sliney will accept it. His first day in the post will in fact be September 11. 2008, PP. 1-2 Entity Tags: Ben Sliney, Jack Kies, Federal Aviation Administration Category Tags: Other Pre-9/11 Events (March 2001): US Holds Intelligence Summit on Terrorist Threat Counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke organizes an intelligence summit on the terrorist threat to the US. The summit takes place at the National Reconnaissance Office in Virginia, and three dozen analysts are in attendance. One important topic of discussion is whether al-Qaeda could obtain a nuclear weapon. AND SCOTT-CLARK, 2007, PP. 305 Entity Tags: Richard A. Clarke Category Tags: Counterterrorism Policy/Politics March-August 2001: Hijacker Atta Familiarizes Himself with Flying Crop-Duster Planes A crop duster at South Florida Crop Care. Colin Braley / Reuters In March and August, Mohamed Atta visits a small airport in South Florida and asks detailed questions about how to start and fly a crop-duster plane. People there easily recall him because he was so persistent. After explaining his abilities, Atta is told he is not skilled enough to fly a crop-duster. HERALD, 9/24/2001 Employees at South Florida Crop Care in Belle Glade, Florida, later tell the FBI that Atta was among the men who in groups of two or three visited the crop dusting firm nearly every weekend for six or eight weeks before the attacks. Employee James Lester says, “I recognized him because he stayed on my feet all the time. I just about had to push him away from me.” PRESS, 9/15/2001 Yet, according to US investigators, Atta and the other hijackers gave up on the crop-duster idea back around May 2000. Entity Tags: James Lester, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Mohamed Atta, South Florida Crop Care Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Mohamed Atta, Alleged Hijackers' Flight Training March-May 2001: FAA Briefs Airports on Security; They Cite, Then Dismiss Possibility of Planes as Weapons A series of top-secret security briefings are given to airport officials at the top 19 airports in the US. The airports warned include those at Boston, Washington, and Newark, which are eventually used by the hijackers. A 9/11 Commission Report on this later notes, “The briefings highlight the threat posed by terrorists in general and bin Laden in particular, including his threats against aviation. The renewed interest in hijacking by terrorist groups is also covered.” The briefings note that if “the intent of the hijacker is not to exchange hostages for prisoners, but to commit suicide in a spectacular explosion, a domestic hijacking would probably be preferable.” But they also note that such a hijacking would be harder to carry out. Around the same time, the FAA distributes an unclassified CD-ROM presentation to airlines and airports. “The presentation cites the possibility that terrorists might conduct suicide hijackings but states: ‘Fortunately, we have no indication that any group is currently thinking in that direction.’” This briefing and presentation doesn’t lead to any upgrade in security or improved passenger screening at the airports. Apparently, the information isn’t widely shared with pilots, flight attendants, passenger screeners, and the like, and it doesn’t lead to any specific FAA advisories or actions. YORK TIMES, 2/10/2005; NEWSDAY, 2/11/2005; NEW JERSEY STAR-LEDGER, 2/11/2005 For instance, Dave Machett, a pilot who is president of the grassroots organization Airline Pilots Security Alliance, says that “Not one word” reached the pilots. “The flight crews were kept completely in the dark about this growing threat.” 2/11/2005 9/11 Commissioner Tim Roemer comments, “The FAA deserves to be raked over the coals for ignoring the warnings and being more concerned about reducing air traffic congestion than dealing with possible terrorist attacks.” JERSEY STAR-LEDGER, 2/11/2005 Entity Tags: Osama bin Laden, Federal Aviation Administration, Tim Roemer, Dave Machett Category Tags: Counterterrorism Policy/Politics, US Air Security March-April 2001: Taliban Envoy Comes to US and Meets with High-Ranking Officials about Handing over Bin Laden Rahmatullah Hashimi. PBS Taliban envoy Rahmatullah Hashimi meets with reporters, middle-ranking State Department bureaucrats, and private Afghanistan experts in Washington. He carries a gift carpet and a letter from Afghan leader Mullah Omar for President Bush. He discusses turning bin Laden over, but the US wants to be handed bin Laden and the Taliban want to turn him over to some third country. A CIA official later says, “We never heard what they were trying to say. We had no common language. Ours was, ‘Give up bin Laden.’ They were saying, ‘Do something to help us give him up.’… I have no doubts they wanted to get rid of him. He was a pain in the neck.” Others claim the Taliban were never sincere. About 20 more meetings on giving up bin Laden take place up until 9/11, all fruitless. POST, 10/29/2001 Allegedly, Hashimi also proposes that the Taliban would hold bin Laden in one location long enough for the US to locate and kill him. However, this offer is refused. This report, however, comes from Laila Helms, daughter of former CIA director Richard Helms. While it’s interesting that this information came out before 9/11, one must be skeptical, since Helms’ job was public relations for the Taliban. VOICE, 6/6/2001 Hashimi will mention to a reporter in June 2001 that he was in the US for a total of six weeks. PRESS INTERNATIONAL, 6/14/2001 According to one article at the time, Hashimi meets with “several senior officials from the State Department, CIA and National Security Council but also from the non-governmental organization Council on Foreign Relations.” Secretary of State Colin Powell is reportedly irate at the meetings because he had not been informed that high level officials would be meeting with Hashimi in the US. He blames CIA Director George Tenet “having laid on a red carpet for Mullah Omar’s adviser.” NEWSLETTER, 4/19/2001 Hashimi reportedly directly meets with Tenet. TIMES, 11/19/2001 Entity Tags: Taliban, US Department of State, Osama bin Laden, National Security Council, Rahmatullah Hashimi, Laila Helms, Colin Powell, Central Intelligence Agency, Council on Foreign Relations, Mullah Omar, George W. Bush, George J. Tenet Category Tags: Hunt for Bin Laden March-April 2001: Al-Qaeda Defector Describes Plot to Hijack US Airplane Chris Isham. Viewimages.com In March 2001, the ISI learns that one of bin Laden’s operatives, who is working on a sensitive al-Qaeda job in Afghanistan, has been providing information to the CIA at the US consulate in Peshawar, Pakistan. The operative, whose CIA codename is “Max,” becomes worried that the ISI will disclose to al-Qaeda his dealings with the CIA. The next month, ABC News reporters Chris Isham and John Miller meet with Max and help him defect to the US and talk to the FBI. Max tells the reporters that in 1999 and 2000 he was trained as part of a small group by Saif al-Adel, one of al-Qaeda’s top leaders. Asked by Isham and Miller whether al-Qaeda is planning any operations targeting the US, he describes a plan to hijack an airplane carrying a US senator or ambassador and then use the dignitary to bargain for the release of the “Blind Sheikh,” Sheikh Omar Abdul-Rahman. US intelligence learned of the same basic plot idea in 1998 (see 1998). Max does defect and will be extensively debriefed by the FBI. STONE, AND MITCHELL, 2002, PP. 282 In May 2001, a Senior Executive Intelligence Brief (SEIB) will be sent to top White House officials warning that “terrorist groups are cooperating on a US hostage plot”(see May 23, 2001). It is not known for how long Max was talking to the CIA or what he told them before he was exposed, but his account contradicts assertions that US intelligence did not have any well placed informants in al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. An Afghan named “Ahmed” defects around the same time and there are similarities between his case and that of Max, but it is unknown if they are in fact the same person or not (see April 2001). Entity Tags: Pakistan Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, Max, Omar Abdul-Rahman, Chris Isham, Al-Qaeda, Saif al-Adel, John Miller Category Tags: Warning Signs, Other Possible Moles or Informants March-April 2001: Mohamed Atta Visits Tennessee Airport; Asks About Nearby Chemical Plant and About Buying Plane Two Middle Eastern men believed to be Mohamed Atta and Marwan Alshehhi land a small plane at Martin Campbell Air Field, near the small town of Copperhill, Tennessee. Danny Whitener, a salvage-car dealer, is tending his plane at the time. The pilot, who calls himself “Mo,” speaks to Whitener for about 15 minutes, aggressively questioning him about a nearby chemical plant and what chemicals are kept there, about a nearby dam, and about two nearby nuclear power plants. According to Whitener, the pilot, who after 9/11 he is convinced was Mohamed Atta, tells him their plane is rented, and that they have flown from Lawrenceville, Georgia, which is about 60 miles south of Copperhill. This would concur with reports of Atta and Alshehhi twice renting a Piper Warrior plane from a Lawrenceville flight school around this time (see (January 25-Early March, 2001)). However, Whitener says their plane on this occasion is a Cessna, which has a very different design to a Warrior. About a month later, according to the airport’s manager John Rutkosky, a man resembling Atta again arrives, this time in an expensive-looking sports car, and inquires about buying a plane. PRESS, 10/19/2001; WBIR (KNOXVILLE), 10/19/2001; DAWN (KARACHI), 11/25/2001; WASHINGTON POST, 12/16/2001 Entity Tags: Marwan Alshehhi, Danny Whitener, Mohamed Atta Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Marwan Alshehhi, Mohamed Atta, Alleged Hijackers' Flight Training March 2001 and After: Hijackers Continue to Associate with Al-Qaeda-Linked Imam Dar al Hijrah mosque. Public domain After living together in Phoenix since December 2000, hijackers Hani Hanjour and Nawaf Alhazmi move to Falls Church, Virginia. POST, 9/10/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 1/26/2004 They live only a few blocks from where two nephews of bin Laden with ties to terrorism go to work (see February-September 11, 1996 and June 1, 2004). They continue to live there off and on until around August. They begin attending the Dar al Hijrah mosque. POST, 9/10/2002 When they and Khalid Almihdhar lived in San Diego in early 2000, they attended a mosque there led by the imam Anwar Al Aulaqi. This imam moved to Falls Church in January 2001, and now the hijackers attend his sermons at the Dar al Hijrah mosque. Some later suspect that Aulaqi is part of the 9/11 plot because of their similar moves, and other reasons: The FBI says Al Aulaqi had closed door meetings with hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar in 2000 while all three of them were living in San Diego. CONGRESS, 7/24/2003 Police later find the phone number of Al Aulaqi’s mosque when they search “would-be twentieth hijacker” Ramzi bin al-Shibh’s apartment in Germany. CONGRESS, 7/24/2003 The FBI was investigating Al Aulaqi for ties to Islamic militant groups in early 2000 (see June 1999-March 2000). A neighbor of Al Aulaqi later claims that, in the first week of August 2001, Al Aulaqi knocked on his door and told him he is leaving for Kuwait: “He came over before he left and told me that something very big was going to happen, and that he had to be out of the country when it happened.” 7/28/2003 US officials will allow Al Aulaqi to leave the US twice in 2002, but by 2008 they will conclude that he is linked to al-Qaeda attacks (see Early September 2006-December 2007 and February 27, 2008). Entity Tags: Hani Hanjour, Khalid Almihdhar, Germany, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Anwar Al Aulaqi, Nawaf Alhazmi, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, 9/11 Commission, 9/11 Congressional Inquiry, Central Intelligence Agency, Osama bin Laden Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Key Hijacker Events, Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Hani Hanjour Early March 2001: Bush Administration Not Ready to Give CIA Expanded Authority to Assassinate Bin Laden Mary McCarthy. Associated Press CIA Director George Tenet will claim in his 2007 book that he attempts to get new covert action authorities to fight bin Laden at this time. He says he wants to move from a defensive to offensive posture, but needs policy backing at a higher level to do it. He meets with Deputy National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley and gives him a list of expanded authorities the CIA is seeking to go after bin Laden. The authorities would permit the CIA or its partners to kill bin Laden without trying to capture him first. Tenet claims that he tells Hadley, “I’m giving you this draft now, but first, you guys need to figure out what your policy is.” The next day, Mary McCarthy, a CIA officer serving as National Security Council (NSC) senior director, calls Tenet’s chief of staff and asks the CIA to take the draft back. She says something to the effect, “If you formally transmit these to the NSC, the clock will be ticking (to take action), and we don’t want the clock to tick just now.” Tenet withdraws the draft. 2007, PP. 143-144 A deputy cabinet level meeting in July 2001 discusses the idea, but no action results (see July 13, 2001). The authorities will be granted a few days after 9/11. 2007, PP. 154 Entity Tags: Mary McCarthy, Central Intelligence Agency, George J. Tenet, Stephen J. Hadley, Osama bin Laden Category Tags: Hunt for Bin Laden Spring and Summer 2001: Self-Proclaimed Intelligence Agent Warns of Terrorist Attacks in New York Susan P. Lindauer. Justin Lane / European Press Photo Agency Susan Lindauer, an American woman with possible, if mysterious, ties to US intelligence, warns her brother John and a friend of hers named Parke Godfrey to stay away from New York because terrorist attacks are likely to take place soon. John Lindauer, a music producer in Los Angeles, and Godfrey, a professor of computer science at a Canadian university, will later confirm having received the warnings. The source of Susan Lindauer’s fear is unclear. YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, 8/29/2004 Lindauer is a journalist and press aide with a somewhat erratic career, according to later press accounts. After brief stints at various newspapers and magazines, she has been working on and off in Washington as a public relations aide for members of Congress. In the early 1990s, she joined an informal discussion group of Congressional aides and intelligence professionals who liked to discuss international politics at a Chinese restaurant on Capitol Hill. A member of the group named Paul A. Hoven, a retired military man who served as a helicopter pilot in Vietnam, soon introduced her to Dr. Richard C. Fuisz. Fuisz, an unusual, globe-trotting physician-businessman, recruited her, according to Lindauer, to serve as an unofficial back-channel go-between with Libya and Iraq. Dr. Fuize, a psychiatrist by training, was identified by a British newspaper as a top CIA officer in Syria during the 1980s. Fuize, Lindauer will claim, was her CIA handler. Lindauer, who proclaims herself a peace activist, will later say that her only interest in her intelligence work was to facilitate peaceful diplomacy between the United States and Iraq and Libya. After the 9/11 attacks, she will maintain her Iraqi contacts and even travel to Baghdad. In 2003, shortly before the the US invasion of Iraq, Lindauer will write to Andrew Card, the White House chief of staff, who happens to be a distant relative of hers, to inform him of diplomatic overtures that Iraqi diplomats in New York have asked her to convey. Card will turn over the letter to the FBI, which will lead to Lindauer’s arrest in March, 2004, for being an unregistered agent for Iraq. YORK TIMES, 3/12/2004; NEW YORK TIMES, 3/12/2004; WASHINGTON POST, 3/12/2004; NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, 8/29/2004 But after several years of a convoluted legal process, prosecutors will withdraw all charges against her in January 2009, after court-appointed experts repeatedly find her to be suffering from paranoia and delusions of grandeur, and therefore unfit for trial. YORK TIMES, 6/18/2008; NEW YORK TIMES, 9/16/2008; KTUU-2 (ANCHORAGE), 1/17/2009 Entity Tags: Susan Lindauer Category Tags: Insider Trading/ Foreknowledge March 1, 2001: Taliban Disregard International Opinion and Destroy Giant Buddha Statues Destruction of the Buddhas of Bamiyan. CNN The Taliban begins blowing up two giant stone Buddhas of Bamiyan—ancient statues carved into an Afghan mountainside, which are considered priceless treasures. They face great international condemnation in response, but no longer seem to be courting international recognition. Apparently, even ISI efforts to dissuade them fail. 8/4/2002; TIME, 8/4/2002 Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf wrote Taliban head Mullah Omar a four-page letter urging him not to blow up the statues, and the letter was secretly hand-delivered to Omar by IS Director Lt. Gen. Mahmood Ahmed, but the letter had no effect. 2008, PP. 409 Omar had previously announced the statues would not be harmed and even opened a National Museum in 2000. The change in policy appears to be due to bin Laden’s growing influence. Journalist Kathy Gannon will later write, “bin Laden’s hardliner rhetoric set the policy, and he campaigned vigorously for the destruction of the statues.” The destruction of the statues further isolates the Taliban internationally, leaving them more dependent on bin Laden’s generosity. 2005, PP. 79-81 Entity Tags: Pervez Musharraf, Mahmood Ahmed, Taliban, Mullah Omar, Osama bin Laden Category Tags: Hunt for Bin Laden, Pipeline Politics, Pakistan and the ISI, Mahmood Ahmed March 1, 2001: Britain Finally Bans Al-Qaeda Britain officially bans al-Qaeda and 20 other alleged terrorist groups, including the Pakistani militant groups Lashkar-e-Toiba, Harkat ul-Mujahedeen, and Jaish-e-Mohammed. 2008, PP. 414 Britain is behind the US on al-Qaeda, as the US officially declared al-Qaeda a foreign terrorist organization in 1999 (see October 8, 1999). However, the US will not declare Harkat ul-Mujahedeen a terrorist organization until September 25, 2001, Lashkar-e-Toiba until December 20, 2001, and Jaish-e-Mohammed until December 26, 2001 (see December 20, 2001). Entity Tags: Harkat ul-Mujahedeen, Jaish-e-Mohammed, Lashkar-e-Toiba, Al-Qaeda Category Tags: Londonistan - UK Counterterrorism March 2001-September 1, 2001: Hani Hanjour and Other Hijackers Live in Paterson, New Jersey The apartment building in Paterson, New Jersey, where some of the hijackers lived. Associated Press Hani Hanjour and Salem Alhazmi rent a one-room apartment in Paterson, New Jersey. Hanjour signs the lease. Nawaf Alhazmi, Saeed Alghamdi, and Mohamed Atta are also seen coming and going by neighbors. One unnamed hijacker has to be told by a neighbor how to screw in a light bulb. YORK TIMES, 9/27/2001; WASHINGTON POST, 9/30/2001; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 10/7/2001 The 9/11 Commission’s account of this differs from previous press accounts, and has Hanjour and Nawaf Alhazmi (instead of his brother Salem) first moving to Paterson in mid-May. Salem Alhazmi, Majed Moqed, Abdulaziz Alomari, Khalid Almihdhar, and probably Ahmed Alghamdi are all seen living there as well during the summer. COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 230 Other reports have Hani Hanjour and Nawaf Alhazmi living periodically in Falls Church, Virginia, over nearly the exact same time period, from March through August 2001 (see March 2001 and After). During this time, Mohamed Atta and other hijackers live in Wayne, New Jersey, a town only one mile from Paterson (see (Before September 2000-12 Months Later)), and Atta purchases a plane ticket to Spain from Apollo Travel in Paterson in early July (see July 8-19, 2001).” RECORD, 9/27/2001; BERGEN RECORD, 9/27/2001; CNN, 10/29/2001; NEWSDAY, 9/19/2002 Entity Tags: Khalid Almihdhar, Majed Moqed, Saeed Alghamdi, Hani Hanjour, Salem Alhazmi, Mohamed Atta, Nawaf Alhazmi, Apollo Travel, Abdulaziz Alomari, Ahmed Alghamdi Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Able Danger, Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Marwan Alshehhi, Mohamed Atta, Hani Hanjour, Other 9/11 Hijackers (March 2001): Assessment for President Bush Identifies Pakistan as ‘Highest Risk’ in Nuclear Proliferation Following a conference on the terrorist threat to the US arranged by counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke (see (March 2001)), President Bush receives a classified assessment concerning the threat. It states that Pakistan is one of the countries that represents the “highest risk” of enabling black-market sales of nuclear weapons. However, no significant action is taken based on the analysis. According to authors Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark, Clarke apparently feels “isolated,” as if only he really understands what Pakistan is doing in terms of nuclear proliferation and where it might lead. AND SCOTT-CLARK, 2007, PP. 305 Entity Tags: Richard A. Clarke, George W. Bush Timeline Tags: US International Relations Category Tags: Counterterrorism Policy/Politics March 4, 2001: Television Show Eerily Envisions 9/11 Attacks An advertisement for the Lone Gunmen show. Fox Contradicting later claims that no one could have envisioned what happened on 9/11, the pilot episode of a short-lived Fox television program involves a scenario chillingly similar to the attacks that occur six months later. In the episode of The Lone Gunmen, which is a spin-off of the popular show The X-Files, a small, radical faction within the US government takes over a large passenger jet plane from the ground, using remote control, and then tries to crash it into the World Trade Center. Their intention is to blame the attack on foreign terrorists and therefore revive the arms race. Their plot is thwarted at the last moment, with the pilots regaining control of the plane and steering it upwards over the Twin Towers. RIDDER, 9/14/2001; JACK MYERS REPORT, 6/20/2002 In the program, the plane is destined for Boston, where two of the hijacked aircraft will in fact take off from on 9/11. TELEVISION, 3/4/2001; BOSTON GLOBE, 9/12/2001 One of its stars, Bruce Harwood, later calls the storyline a “strange awful coincidence,” adding, “Who knows if it was the source of inspiration for September 11.” 11/26/2002 Ratings are good for the show, with 13 million people watching it. GUIDE, 3/9/2001 Yet despite the similarity to the actual attacks on the WTC, there will be very little commentary about this after 9/11. Media commentator Jack Myers later observes, “This seems to be collective amnesia of the highest order.” MYERS REPORT, 6/20/2002 A best selling 1994 novel by Tom Clancy had similarly included a large passenger jet used as a weapon, being deliberately crashed into the US Capitol building (see August 17, 1994). 5/20/2002 Entity Tags: World Trade Center, Jack Myers, Bruce Harwood Category Tags: Warning Signs March 7, 2001: Plan to Fight Al-Qaeda Considered, but with Little Urgency Deputy National Security Adviser Steve Hadley chairs an informal meeting of some counterparts from other agencies to discuss al-Qaeda. They begin a broad review of the government’s approach to al-Qaeda and Afghanistan. According to the New York Times, the approach is “two-pronged and included a crisis warning effort to deal with immediate threats and longer-range planning by senior officials to put into place a comprehensive strategy to eradicate al-Qaeda.” Counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke again pushes for immediate decisions on assisting Ahmed Shah Massoud and his Northern Alliance in Afghanistan. Hadley suggests dealing with this as part of the broad review. Clarke supports a larger program, but he warns that delay risks the Alliance’s defeat. Clarke also advocates using the armed Predator drone. However, despite an increasing number of alarming warnings following this meeting, there is little follow-up. “By June, a draft of a presidential directive authorizing an ambitious covert action plan is circulating through the upper echelons of the administration, but there seems little urgency about putting the plan into effect.” YORK TIMES, 3/24/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 3/24/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 3/24/2004; NEW YORK TIMES, 4/4/2004 Entity Tags: Richard A. Clarke, Stephen J. Hadley, Northern Alliance, Al-Qaeda, Ahmed Shah Massoud Category Tags: Hunt for Bin Laden March 7, 2001: Russia Submits Report on Bin Laden to UN Security Council, US Fails to Act on It The Russian Permanent Mission at the United Nations secretly submits “an unprecedentedly detailed report” to the UN Security Council about bin Laden, his whereabouts, details of his al-Qaeda network, Afghan drug running, and Taliban connections to Pakistan and the ISI. The report provides “a listing of all bin Laden’s bases, his government contacts and foreign advisers,” and enough information to potentially locate and kill him. It is said to contain an “astonishing degree of information.” The US fails to use the information in any noticable manner. Alex Standish, the editor of the highly respected Jane’s Intelligence Review, concludes that the attacks of 9/11 were less of an American intelligence failure than the result of “a political decision not to act against bin Laden.” INTELLIGENCE REVIEW, 10/5/2001; TIMES OF INDIA, 10/8/2001 In May 2002, Jane’s will further comment,“it is becoming clear that this was only the most high profile of a number of attempts by the Russians to alert the US and other members of the Security Council to the extent of the inter-dependence between the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and the ISI. According to our Russian sources, there was a regular flow of information from Moscow to the US dating back to the last years of the Clinton presidency. It seems apparent, however, that although this intelligence was being received by the CIA and other US agencies, there was a distinct lack of enthusiasm within political - as opposed to military - circles for the launch of pre-emptive strikes against either the Taliban or al-Qaeda. However, given the detailed intelligence being provided by the Russians - and the fact that bin Laden was making very clear threats to launch further strikes against US targets - it seems bizarre, to say the least, that no high-level political decision was taken to focus US intelligence efforts on al-Qaeda and its international network…” INTELLIGENCE DIGEST, 5/28/2002 Entity Tags: Russia, Al-Qaeda, United Nations, Osama bin Laden Category Tags: Hunt for Bin Laden, Pakistan and the ISI March 8, 2001: US Declines to Freeze Al-Qaeda’s Assets Despite Call from UN and European Union In December 2000, the US and Russia cosponsored a United Nations Security Council resolution requiring member states to “freeze without delay” the funds of those on a list of designated terrorists. The resolution passed, and the UN and European Union (EU) release the list on this day. It contains the names of five alleged al-Qaeda leaders, including bin Laden’s security coordinator, brother-in-law, and financial handler. Yet strangely, the US itself does not freeze the assets of these five leaders, and will only so one month after 9/11 (see October 12, 2001). NATIONS, 3/8/2001; LOS ANGELES TIMES, 10/15/2001 The Guardian will report after 9/11, “Members of Congress want to know why treasury officials charged with disrupting the finances of terrorists did not follow” the UN and EU. 10/13/2001 Entity Tags: European Union, United States, United Nations, Russia, US Department of the Treasury, Al-Qaeda Category Tags: Hunt for Bin Laden, Terrorism Financing Mid-March 2001: Hijackers Meet with ID Forger Majed Moqed. FBI Hijackers Ahmed Alghamdi, Majed Moqed, Hani Hanjour, and Nawaf Alhazmi stay for four days in the Fairfield Motor Inn, Fairfield, Connecticut. They meet with Eyad M. Alrababah, a Jordanian living in Bridgeport, who has been charged with providing false identification to at least 50 illegal aliens. This meeting takes place about six weeks before the FBI says Moqed and Alghamdi enter the US. PRESS, 3/6/2002; US CONGRESS, 9/26/2002 Entity Tags: Nawaf Alhazmi, Ahmed Alghamdi, Hani Hanjour, Eyad M. Alrababah, Majed Moqed Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Other 9/11 Hijackers, Hani Hanjour, Alhazmi and Almihdhar March 15, 2001: India, Iran, Russia, and US Work in Concert to Remove Taliban Jane’s Intelligence Review reports that the US is working with India, Iran, and Russia “in a concerted front against Afghanistan’s Taliban regime.” India is supplying the Northern Alliance with military equipment, advisers, and helicopter technicians and both India and Russia are using bases in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan for their operation. INTELLIGENCE REVIEW, 3/15/2001 Entity Tags: Tajikistan, Taliban, Russia, Northern Alliance, Iran, Uzbekistan, India Category Tags: Hunt for Bin Laden March 23, 2001: Rice Warned about Al-Qaeda Cells in US The US government is considering reopening Pennsylvania Avenue in front of the White House, which had been closed because of security concerns. But counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke warns National Security Adviser Rice that terrorists could easily drive a truck bomb, which he calls their “weapon of choice,” right into the White House. While discussing this, Clarke tells Rice that he thinks there are terrorist cells within the US, including al-Qaeda cells. COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 255 Entity Tags: Condoleezza Rice, Richard A. Clarke Category Tags: Warning Signs March 23, 2001: Alhazmi Buys Aeronautical Chart Nawaf Alhazmi purchases a World aeronautical chart covering the northeastern United States from a store in Phoenix, Arizona. In addition, he purchases a National Geographic road atlas, a Unique Media map of the United States, and a Unique Media map of New York City. He also purchases flight deck videos around this time (see November 5, 2000-June 20, 2001). DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006, PP. 31 Alhazmi is living with Hani Hanjour, who is in pilot training (see January-February 2001 and February 8-March 12, 2001). Alhazmi also says he is learning to be a pilot at this time (see (December 2000-January 2001)). Entity Tags: Nawaf Alhazmi Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Alleged Hijackers' Flight Training March 23, 2001: DEA Issues Alert to Look Out for Israeli Spies The cover of the DEA report, as depicted on television. Fox News The Office of National Drug Control Policy issues a National Security Alert describing “apparent attempts by Israeli nationals to learn about government personnel and office layouts.” This later becomes known through a leaked DEA document called “Suspicious Activities Involving Israeli Art Students at DEA Facilities.” A crackdown ensues and by June, around 120 Israelis are apprehended. More are apprehended later. ENFORCEMENT AGENCY, 6/2001 Entity Tags: “Israeli art students”, Office of National Drug Control Policy Category Tags: Israel March 26, 2001: CIA Benefits from Major Software Improvements The Washington Post reports on major improvements of the CIA’s intelligence gathering capability “in recent years.” A new program called Oasis uses “automated speech recognition” technology to turn audio feeds into formatted, searchable text. It can distinguish one voice from another and differentiates “speaker 1” from “speaker 2” in transcripts. Software called Fluent performs “cross lingual” searches, translates difficult languages like Chinese and Japanese (apparently such software is much better than similar publicly available software), and even automatically assesses the contextual importance. Other new software can turn a suspect’s “life story into a three-dimensional diagram of linked phone calls, bank deposits and plane trips,” while still other software can efficiently and quickly process vast amounts of video, audio, and written data. POST, 3/26/2001 However, the government will later report that a number of messages about the 9/11 attacks, such as one stating “tomorrow is the zero hour,” are not translated until after 9/11 because analysts were “too swamped.” NEWS, 6/7/2002 Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Oasis, Fluent Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Remote Surveillance March 28, 2001: Florida INS Official Alleges Middle Eastern Immigrants with Possible Terrorist Ties Are Bribing Their Way into US Mary Schneider, a veteran Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) employee in Orlando, Florida, writes to Attorney General John Ashcroft to warn that a ring of corrupt INS officers is taking bribes from illegal Moroccan and Egyptian immigrants. She is concerned some of these illegal aliens let into the country could have ties to terrorist organizations, and calls for an investigation. Schneider started complaining to her supervisors in 1998 and claims she was retaliated against by management. In May 1999, she wrote to the FBI’s anti-terrorism joint task force in New York to warn of the possible terrorist ties of some of the illegal immigrants allowed into the country by her office. She says some of them could be linked to Ihab Ali Nawawi, an Orlando taxi driver arrested in 1999 for his ties to Osama bin Laden (see May 18, 1999). It is not known what actions, if any, were taken as a result of her warnings. TIMES BROWARD-PALM BEACH, 11/8/2001 Entity Tags: Immigration and Naturalization Service, Ihab Ali Nawawi, John Ashcroft, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Mary Schneider Category Tags: Counterterrorism Action Before 9/11 March 30-April 13, 2001: Jarrah Visits Family, Tells Girlfriend He Wants Children Soon Ziad Jarrah amd Aisel Senguen holidaying in Paris in the fall of 2000. McDermott Ziad Jarrah flies from Atlanta to Dusseldorf via Amsterdam. He then returns to Lebanon to see his father, who is ill. On his way back to the US, he stops in Bochum, Germany, to see his girlfriend and tells her he wants to have children soon. He is re-admitted to the US as a business visitor for three and a half months. COMMISSION, 8/21/2004, PP. 21 ; MCDERMOTT, 2005, PP. 213 Entity Tags: Aysel Senguen, Ziad Jarrah Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Ziad Jarrah Late March-Early April 2001: CIA Warns Al-Qaeda Leader Zubaida Planning an Attack The CIA issues repeated warnings that al-Qaeda leader Abu Zubaida may be planning an attack for the near future. One report cites a source indicating an attack on Israel, Saudi Arabia, or India. At this time, the CIA believes Zubaida was a major figure in the Millennium plots (see May 30, 2001). Counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke relays these reports to National Security Adviser Rice. She is also briefed on Zubaida’s activities and the CIA’s efforts to locate him. COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 255; US DISTRICT COURT OF EASTERN VIRGINIA, 5/4/2006, PP. 1 Entity Tags: Richard A. Clarke, Central Intelligence Agency, Condoleezza Rice, Abu Zubaida Category Tags: Warning Signs, Abu Zubaida